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Abstract— We study a dynamical model of a population
of cooperators and defectors whose actions have long-term
consequences on environmental “commons” - what we term the
“resource”. Cooperators contribute to restoring the resource
whereas defectors degrade it. The population dynamics evolve
according to a replicator equation coupled with an environ-
mental state. Our goal is to identify methods of influencing
the population with the objective to maximize accumulation
of the resource. In particular, we consider strategies that
modify individual-level incentives. We then extend the model to
incorporate a public opinion state that imperfectly tracks the
true environmental state, and study strategies that influence
opinion. We formulate optimal control problems and solve
them using numerical techniques to characterize locally optimal
control policies for three problem formulations: 1) control of
incentives, and control of opinions through 2) propaganda-like
strategies and 3) awareness campaigns. We show numerically
that the resulting controllers in all formulations achieve the
objective, albeit with an unintended consequence. The resulting
dynamics include cycles between low and high resource states -
a dynamical regime termed an “oscillating tragedy of the com-
mons”. This outcome may have desirable average properties,
but includes risks to resource depletion. Our findings suggest
the need for new approaches to controlling coupled population-
environment dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
A tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals in a
population are driven by their own selfish interests, resulting
in the depletion of a common resource on which they all de-
pend. The interactions that drive such tragedies are modeled
in classical game theory as a prisoner’s dilemma [1], [2], [3].
The rational choice for an individual is to defect, regardless
of what others are doing. However, classical models do not
account for the consequences of action - individual actions
affect the environment. Consequently, the state of the envi-
ronment may shape individual incentives for future action.
Dynamical models of these coevolutionary features have
been developed to understand general conditions under which
tragedies will occur or be averted [3], [4], [5]. Similarly, the
study of common-pool resource games suggest that rational
play among larger populations leads to resource collapse with
higher probability [6], [7].
1School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute
of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332 kpaarporn@gatech.edu,
ywardi@ece.gatech.edu
2Industrial & Systems Engineering Department, Texas A&M University,
College Station, TX 77843 eksinc@exchange.tamu.edu
3School of Biological Sciences, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta,
GA
4School of Physics, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA
jsweitz@gatech.edu
In his landmark paper [8], Hardin argues that such
tragedies are inevitable given a growing human population,
unless preventative measures are taken. To address the prob-
lem of preventing tragedies, there has been speculation about
what intervention strategies will be effective. Interventions
from centralized government entities are called for, through
implementing and enforcing new policies restricting overcon-
sumption [2], [9]. For example, imposing taxes on resource
usage may provide a financial deterrent to overuse [10].
Passing regulatory laws on fishers gives fish populations
a chance to recover [11]. Hence, such direct intervention
policies provide the incentives necessary to instigate conser-
vation behaviors [12].
Information also plays an important role. Individuals may
not take pro-environmental actions if they are not informed
about why such actions are necessary [13]. Environmental
awareness and education can lead to behavior changes when
individuals realize that environmental degradation has ad-
verse effects on their own community or household. For
example, information from household metering about the
severity of water scarcity drove efforts to conserve water
[14]. However, statistics and facts may be ineffective to
instigate behavior changes if such issues are politicized [15].
In these situations, public opinion is susceptible to propa-
ganda from news outlets and social media. Environmental
information is necessary to affect behavior change, but may
not be sufficient [16], [12], [13]. The efficacy of these
proposed solutions are rarely tested using dynamical models
that couple actions and environmental changes [2].
A taxation mechanism on resource investment was studied
in the setting of a common-pool resource game where
under certain conditions, higher tax rates can lead to lower
probability of resource collapse [10]. However, asymptotic
outcomes are not considered in this static one-shot game.
In a recent work [17], an infinite horizon optimal control
framework was applied to a dynamical model1 to identify
conditions under which an optimal prescribed consumption
rate ensures resource sustainability. However, the consump-
tion rate is not directly manipulated by taxing, pricing, or
other social control policies.
In contrast, we consider in this paper such direct control
policies. We formulate optimal control problems that study
the role of incentive and information-based intervention
policies with the objective of maximally conserving the
1Those dynamics can be reduced to a linear system by an appropriate
transformation. This differs fundamentally from the dynamical system con-
sidered in this paper, which is highly nonlinear and cannot be transformed
into a linear system.
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environmental state over a finite time horizon. We apply
these control formulations to the model of ref. [3], due to
its general framework. It models a population of myopic
individuals whose actions affect and are affected by the
environment. This framework differs from that of differ-
ential games [18], where individuals select strategies to
maximize long-term payoffs given action-dependent dynamic
environments. We formulate an incentive control problem
by allowing an external entity to influence the population’s
incentive to cooperate together. To implement information-
based control policies, we introduce a dynamic public opin-
ion that imperfectly tracks the true environmental state. We
present two formulations in which the control directly affects
public opinion: propaganda strategies that perturb public
opinion, and awareness-raising strategies where learning of
the true environmental state is encouraged. In all three
formulations, we compute optimal controls by numerical
means (by “optimal” in this paper, we mean locally optimal
since the problems we formulate are nonconvex).
The main contributions and findings of this paper are 1)
the formulation of optimal control problems to address the
tragedy of the commons through direct policy interventions
and 2) the solutions of these problems, obtained by numerical
techniques, result in highly oscillatory behavior. In particular,
we show through simulations that the objectives of the
formulated problems are achieved, at the expense of inducing
highly variant dynamics characterized by oscillatory cycles
between low and high resource states.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
the feedback-evolving game model of [3]. Section III for-
mulates the incentive optimal control problem, and presents
numerical results from applying a suitable control algorithm
[19]. We prove in this formulation that an optimal controller
is necessarily bang-bang. In Section IV, we introduce the
public opinion dynamics, formulate the propaganda and
awareness-raising control problems, and present numerical
results. Concluding remarks and discussion points are given
in Section V.
II. MODEL
A. Feedback-evolving games
Here, we review the model of [3], which incorporates
environmental feedback into replicator dynamics of a 2× 2
game, where the strategies are cooperate (C) and defect (D).
This model is intended to provide a general framework in
which to portray the dynamics of tragedy of the commons
scenarios. It incorporates an environment state n(t) ∈ [0, 1]
where n = 0 (n = 1) means the environment is completely
depleted (replenished). We will use the terms environment
and common resources interchangeably to refer to n. The
game payoffs are determined by n as follows.
An =
[
Rn Sn
Tn Pn
]
≡ n
[
R1 S1
T1 P1
]
+(1−n)
[
R0 S0
T0 P0
]
.
(1)
When n = 1, agents play a game determined by the payoff
matrix A1, given by the first matrix of the right-hand side
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Fig. 1: (Adapted from [3]) Summary of all possible dynam-
ical outcomes given choice of payoffs in deplete state. The
regions are determined by the relative payoffs S0 − P0 (x-
axis) and R0−T0 (y-axis). The phase portraits are illustrated
in each region, where blue dots indicate stable fixed points
of the dynamics. The seven regions include outcomes where
a tragedy of the commons (TOC) occurs, and where a TOC
is averted. We assign labels to each region, which includes
four TOC outcomes, two averted outcomes (V1 and V2), and
one oscillating TOC (OTOC). Here, the white dot indicates
an unstable fixed point.
above. Similarly, when n = 0, the game is determined by
the second matrix above, A0. In the game with payoffs A1,
we impose that defection is the dominant strategy, that is,
R1 < T1 and S1 < P1. Thus, players will always prefer
to defect when resources are abundant. The only pure Nash
equilibrium in this game is mutual defection, where players
obtain a payoff P1. The structure of the game in the depleted
state, given by the payoff matrix A0, is a free parameter
to allow different asymptotic outcomes of the system. The
frequency-dependent fitnesses for cooperators and defectors
are therefore
fC(x, n) = Rnx+ Sn(1− x) (cooperator fitness)
fD(x, n) = Tnx+ Pn(1− x) (defector fitness)
(2)
where x ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction (frequency) of cooperators
in the population, and 1 − x the fraction of defectors.
The game-environment coupled dynamics obey the following
differential equations.
x˙ = x(1− x)g(x, n)
n˙ = n(1− n)(θx− (1− x))
x0, n0 ∈ [0, 1]
(3)
where g(x, n) ≡ fC(x, n) − fD(x, n) is the difference in
fitness between cooperators and defectors. The n(1−n) term
indicates a logistic growth of the environmental state, and
serves to constrain the dynamics to n(t) ∈ [0, 1] ∀t ≥ 0.
The growth or decline of the environment depends on the
fraction x of cooperators in the population, who enhance n
at a rate θ > 0 while defectors degrade n at a rate −1. We
denote the state vector y(t) ≡ [x(t), n(t)]> and the system
mapping of (3) as F : [0, 1]2 → R2.
There are four “corner” fixed points, (0,0), (1,0), (0,1),
and (1,1). When x = 0, the trajectory is confined to the left
edge of the state space, and converges to the equilibrium
(0,0). When x = 1, it is on the right edge and converges
to (1,1). When n = 0, the dynamics follow a replicator
dynamic corresponding to the base game A0, and when
n = 1, the dynamic converges to (0,1) since this corresponds
to replicator dynamics of the PD game. However, we focus
our attention on system dynamics in the interior of the state
space (0, 1)2, which is forward invariant.
B. Summary of dynamics in feedback-evolving games
The behavior of the system (3) relies on the choice of
the payoff parameters R0, S0, T0, and P0 of the game A0.
There are seven possible dynamical regimes, and they are
summarized and named in Figure 1. The outcomes that
are possible include a tragedy of the commons (TOC1 -
TOC4), aversion of TOC (V1 and V2), and an “oscillating”
TOC (OTOC). In V2, trajectories asymptotically approach
an interior fixed point. In OTOC, trajectories approach
an asymptotically stable heteroclinic cycle, defined by the
counter-clockwise orientation of the corners and the edges
connecting them (see SI of [3] for details). This dynamical
outcome is termed an “oscillating tragedy of the commons”
because it is characterized by cycles between replete and
deplete environmental states.
III. INCENTIVE CONTROL POLICIES
A. Optimal control formulation
We consider here strategic policies that influence indi-
viduals’ incentives to cooperate together with the goal of
conserving public resources over time. The control variable
u(t) is applied to the payoff matrix (1) as follows.
An(u(t)) = n
[
R1 S1
T1 P1
]
+ (1− n)
[
R0 + u(t) S0
T0 P0
]
.
(4)
In this formulation, we will constrain u(t) ∈ [−um, um] for
all t, where um > 0 is a positive constant. We formulate
the following optimal control problem in Bolza form with
no terminal cost.
max
u
J =
∫ Tf
0
n2(t)dt
subject to

x˙ = x(1− x)g(x, n) + x2(1− x)(1− n)u
n˙ = n(1− n)(−1 + (1 + θ)x)
x0, n0 ∈ (0, 1)
u(t) ∈ [−um, um] ∀t ∈ [0, Tf ]
(5)
Recall that x and n are the state variables with u as
the control. The term x2(1 − x)(1 − n) appears after re-
deriving the replicator equation with the payoff (4) in the
same manner as (2) with the payoff matrix An(u). The
Hamiltonian of this formulation is
H(y,λ, u) =λxx(1− x)(g(x, n) + x(1− n)u)
+ λnn(1− n)(−1 + (1 + θ)) + n2
(6)
The first-order optimality conditions required by Pontrya-
gin’s Maximum Principle (PMP) are given by the co-state
dynamical equations
λ˙x = −∂H
∂x
(y,λ, u)
λ˙n = −∂H
∂n
(y,λ, u)
λx(Tf ) = λn(Tf ) = 0
(7)
and the pointwise maximizer of the Hamiltonian
u∗(t) =

um if ϕ(t) > 0
? if ϕ(t) = 0
−um if ϕ(t) < 0
(8)
where ϕ(t) ≡ x2(1 − x)(1 − n)λx(t) is the switching
function. In the case when ϕ(t) = 0, the Hamiltonian is
independent of u, and hence u∗ can take an arbitrary value.
Note that x2(1−x)(1−n) > 0 for all t because of invariance
of the interior. As long as ϕ(t) = 0 does not occur on an
open interval in the time horizon [0, Tf ], u∗(t) is a bang-
bang controller (no singular arcs). Hence, u∗(t) will only
take two values - the minimum and maximum points in the
constraint set [−um, um]. We prove that this is indeed true,
using the Lie bracket to rule out the existence of any singular
arcs (Ch. 4.4 of [20]). At the isolated switching times, we
may assume u∗(t) takes one of the two values {−um, um}
to enforce one-sided continuity.
Proposition 1. An optimal controller u∗ given by (8) is
non-singular. That is, it switches between the two values
{−um, um} at isolated points in the horizon interval [0, Tf ].
Proof. The switching function can be written as the inner
product
ϕ(t) = 〈λ, G〉 (9)
where G = [x2(1−x)(1−n), 0]> is the control-affine vector
field. The time derivative is given by
ϕ˙(t) = 〈λ, [F,G]〉 (10)
where F is the state vector field and
[F,G] =
∂G
∂y
F − ∂F
∂y
G (11)
is the Lie bracket of the vector fields F and G. For non-
singularity to hold for u∗, ϕ˙ cannot be zero when ϕ(t) =
0. This is equivalent to proving the vector fields G and
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(b) State-dependent initial guess u0(t) = sgn(x(t)− xc).
Fig. 2: Simulation results from applying Algorithm 1 with [R0, S0, T0, P0] = [4.5, 4, 3, 3] and um = 1 to incentive control
problem (5). In left panels (a), we applied 40 iterations with u0(t) = 0 (runtime 485 s). (Top) Environment dynamics n(t)
(black) overlayed with the resulting control u40 (red). (Bottom Left) Objective scores J(uk) =
∫ Tf
0
n2(t)dt vs iteration
number k, where J(u40) = 25.6359. (Bottom Right) The optimality function Θ(uk) (eq (23) in Appendix) vs iteration
number k, where Θ(u40) ≈ −0.0033. In right panels (b), we set u0(t) = sgn(x − xc), and run 20 iterations (runtime 103
s). We obtain J(u20) = 29.9707 and Θ(u20) = −1.95× 10−5.
[F,G] are linearly independent. After some calculation, this
amounts to checking independence for the vectors[
1
0
]
,
[
g(x, n)(1− x)− n(−1 + (1 + θ)x)− x(1− x) ∂g∂x−n(1− n)(1 + θ)
]
(12)
corresponding to G and [F,G], respectively. Since the second
entry of [F,G] is always non-zero, these vectors are linearly
independent. 
B. Numerical simulations
We use the optimal control algorithm described in [19],
which is formally presented as Algorithm 1 in the Appendix.
The algorithm is based on hill climbing with Armijo step size
[21]. The direction it follows at each iteration is based on
an explicit computation of the pointwise maximizer of the
Hamiltonian function at time-points t in a given finite grid.
Hence, its effectiveness hinges on how easy it is to compute
the maximizers. In the formulation (5), the state equation is
affine in the control u and nonlinear in the state variable.
We applied Algorithm 1 to the problem (5), where we fix
[R1, S1, T1, P1] = [3, 1, 6, 2], θ = 0.7, x0 = 0.7, n0 = 0.3,
Tf = 100, um = 1, and Armijo parameters α = β = 0.5.
The values of [R0, S0, T0, P0] are left unfixed in order to
survey different outcomes from the distinct dynamical re-
gions (see Figure 1). In addition, we leave several parameters
of the algorithm to user discretion, e.g. the initial control
guess u0(t) and the number of iterations. We utilize RK4-
based integration solvers (ode45) for forward and backwards
integration. Due to high nonlinearity of the state equation,
a low error tolerance is required to produce accurate and
numerically stable forward dynamics y(t), where we use
relative and absolute tolerance values of 10−8.
In sample experiments from the four TOC regions, the
resulting controllers were all unable to prevent the envi-
ronment n(t) from becoming depleted by the end of the
time horizon. Of particular interest is the resulting controlled
dynamics when A0(u) is confined within the V2 regime for
all u ∈ [−1, 1], which we display in Figure 2. With initial
control guess u0(t) = 0, the algorithm converges after 40
iterations to a controller that induces the states x(t) and n(t)
to oscillate with greater amplitudes by applying the maximal
negative incentive u(t) = −1 near the peaks of n(t).
It then quickly re-applies the maximum positive incentive
u(t) = 1. Motivated by this resonance-like behavior, we run
the algorithm again with the state-dependent initial guess
u0(t) = sgn(x− xc), which switches between ±1 precisely
at the points where n˙(t) = 0. Here, xc ≡ 1/(1 + θ). The
resulting controller after 20 iterations has deviated slightly
away from this initial guess, and it outperforms the controller
from the first experiment (J = 25.6359 vs 29.9707). Also
shown in Figure 2 are the iterates of the optimality function
Θ(uk) (see (23) in Appendix), which is always non-positive.
In these simulations, Θ(uk) approaches zero, which indicates
convergence to an optimal control satisfying PMP. The
optimal controllers induce oscillatory behavior in a regime
where the uncontrolled system settles at an intermediate
equilibrium.
IV. INFORMATION CONTROL POLICIES
In this section, we extend the dynamics of (3) to incor-
porate a public opinion state o(t) ∈ [0, 1]. The state o(t)
is interpreted to be the average opinion in the population
about the environment, and the population responds instead
to this belief. We then formulate and numerically solve, using
Algorithm 1, two optimal control problems where influence
is applied directly to o(t).
A. Model with public opinion
We introduce the following dynamics to model how opin-
ions change in the population.
x˙ = x(1− x)g(x, o)
n˙ = n(1− n)(θx− (1− x))
o˙ = −γ(o− n)
x0, n0, o0 ∈ (0, 1)
(13)
where γ > 0. The form of the o˙ equation induces o(t) to
track the environmental state n(t). There is a lag between
actual changes in the environment and the public becoming
informed about the changes. The learning parameter γ > 0
determines how slow this lag is. For γ low, o(t) will not adapt
quickly to the fluctuating n(t). As γ increases, o(t) more
successfully tracks n(t). The x˙ equation above is modified
from (3) by replacing the relative fitness g(x, n) with g(x, o).
Here, individual incentives are now determined by the current
public opinion and not the true environmental state n. Thus,
the previous system dynamics (3) can be interpreted as
the population responding to perfect information about the
environment, o(t) = n(t) ∀t ≥ 0. We denote the system
mapping (13) with the mapping F o : [0, 1]3 → R3.
We illustrate the dynamical effects of the public opinion
for three dynamical regimes in Figure 3. A notable effect
occurs in the V2 and OTOC regimes, where the (x(t), n(t))
trajectories are pushed towards the boundary of the state
space. This is due to the delay in opinion, and the intuition is
as follows. When n(t) starts to increase towards a peak, o(t)
lags behind and stays below n(t). This causes more of the
population to become cooperators, since they are responding
to lower public opinion relative to the true resource state. As
a result, n(t) is restored more than it would have been if the
population had perfect information. Then, o(t) overestimates
n(t) as it decreases, causing more of the population to defect,
degrading the environment. This process continues to repeat,
causing oscillations to have larger amplitudes.
B. Optimal control formulation: propaganda strategies
Here, we consider an external entity, e.g. media platforms,
politicians, and activists, that seeks to maximally conserve
the environment by influencing the public’s opinion. First, we
study policies that perturb opinion by injecting information.
Propaganda and media broadcasts can achieve such pertur-
bations, for example. We formulate the following optimal
control problem.
max
u
J =
1
2
∫ Tf
0
C1n
2(t)− C2u2(t)dt
subject to

x˙ = x(1− x)g(x, o)
n˙ = n(1− n)(−1 + (1 + θ)x)
o˙ = −γ(o− n) + o(1− o)u
x0, n0, o0 ∈ (0, 1)
(14)
where C1, C2 > 0 are the priority and regulator weights, re-
spectively. We denote the above dynamics as y˙ = F o(y, u).
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Fig. 3: Comparison of public opinion-induced dynamics
(Left column) and the original feedback-evolving game
(Right column). (Top row) A0 = [R0, S0;T0, P0] =
[5, 2; 3, 3] (regime TOC1). Delay of opinion does not help
to restore the commons. (Middle row) A0 = [4.5, 4; 3, 3]
(regime V2). Delayed opinion destabilizes the interior fixed
point. (Bottom row) A0 = [7, 4; 3, 3] (regime OTOC). Public
opinion facilitates convergence to heteroclinic cycle in the
(x, n) trajectories. In all simulations, [R1, S1, T1, P1] =
[3, 1, 6, 2], γ = .5, θ = .5, x0 = .5, n0 = .3, o0 = .3.
The additive control term o(1 − o)u serves two purposes.
First, it keeps the dynamics well-posed, i.e. a solution o(t)
that starts in [0, 1] will stay in [0, 1]. Second, it models the
difficulty to influence extreme opinions. The additive term
decreases to zero as o approaches the extremes 0 and 1, and
hence more influence is required to move o(t) away from the
extremes. Note that the control function is left unconstrained,
u(t) ∈ R ∀t ∈ [0, Tf ]. The Hamiltonian is
H(y,λ, u) = λxx(1− x)g(x, o) + λnn(1− n)(θx− (1− x))
+ λo(−γ(o− n) + o(1− o)u) + 1
2
(C1n
2 − C2u2)
(15)
where the costate λ = [λx, λn, λo]> obeys the dynamics
λ˙ = −∂H
∂y
(y,λ, u) (16)
with λ(Tf ) = [0, 0, 0]>. The expression of H is concave in
u, and hence it admits the unique point-wise maximizer
u∗(t) =
1
C2
λo(t)o(t)(1− o(t)). (17)
We applied Algorithm 1 to the problem (14). We fix the
priority weight C1 = 1, and study modifications to the
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Fig. 4: An application of Algorithm 1 with [R0, S0, T0, P0] = [4.5, 4, 3, 3] (V2 regime) to propaganda control problem (14)
with Tf = 50. In left panels (a), we applied 20 iterations (runtime 69.938 s) with u0(t) = 0. (Top) State trajectories.
After u20(t) is applied on t ∈ [0, Tf ], dynamics are continued without control for a time of length 50. (Bottom Left)
The control function u20(t). (Bottom Right) Objective scores J(uk) vs iteration number k, where J(u20) = 8.629 and
Θ(u20) = −0.0048 (not plotted). In right panels (b), we set C2 = 0.001 and run 20 iterations (runtime 257.197 s). We
obtain J(u20) = 22.22 and Θ(u20) = −0.023.
regulator weight C2. We fix [R1, S1, T1, P1] = [3, 1, 6, 2],
θ = 0.5, γ = 0.5, (x0, n0, o0) = (.5, .3, .3), Tf = 50, and
Armijo parameters α = β = 0.5. First, a notable observation
was that the environmental state could be rescued in the
TOC1 regime for a limited time, followed by collapse, if
effort cost was low (C2 = .001). When the cost weights are
balanced, e.g. C2 = 1, we did not observe resurgence of the
commons in any of the TOC regimes.
In regime V2, when control effort is balanced (C2 = 1,
Figure 4a), the computed control applies effort in waves.
The control starts with a high negative amplitude as o(t)
and n(t) begin to ascend, pushing o(t) lower relative to
n(t) to cause a resurgence of cooperators (blue line). The
control then relaxes its effort as the states o(t), n(t) begin
to decrease, t ≈ 15. It applies negative effort again as n(t)
and o(t) begin to ascend around t ∈ [30, 40]. Hence, the
control u(t) promotes cooperation through negative control
effort at selected times during the horizon. This causes the
environment to oscillate between more extreme depleted and
repleted states. In Figure 4b with C2 = 0.001, control
effort is cheap. The resulting control applies a large neg-
ative impulse at the beginning to push o(t) very low. This
stimulates the growth of cooperators and consequently, the
environment, which stays near n = 1 until after t = Tf . After
the initial impulse, u(t) relaxes for the rest of the horizon,
causing o(t) to eventually catch up to n(t) and causing
defectors to dominate. In the absence of control (after Tf ),
the environment collapses but will be subject again to another
resurgence. Similar results are obtained when applying the
algorithm in the OTOC dynamical regime.
C. Environmental awareness strategies
We now consider strategic information policies that guide
public opinion towards the true environmental state n(t).
Environmental awareness and educational campaigns are ex-
amples of interventions that serve this purpose. We formulate
the following optimal control problem, with u(t) ∈ [0,∞)
non-negative for all t ∈ [0, Tf ] directly affecting the public
learning parameter γ > 0.
max
u
J =
1
2
∫ Tf
0
C1n
2(t)− C2u2(t)dt
subject to

x˙ = x(1− x)g(x, o)
n˙ = n(1− n)(−1 + (1 + θ)x)
o˙ = −(γ + u)(o− n)
u(t) ∈ [0,∞),∀t ∈ [0, Tf ]
x0, n0, o0 ∈ (0, 1)
(18)
The Hamiltonian of the awareness control problem is
H(y,λ, u) = λxx(1− x)g(x, o) + λnn(1− n)(θx− (1− x))
− λo(γ + u)(o− n) + 1
2
(C1n
2 − C2u2).
(19)
where the costate λ = [λx, λn, λo]> obeys the dynamics
λ˙ = −∂H
∂y
(y,λ, u) (20)
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Fig. 5: An application of Algorithm 1 to the awareness control problem (18) with Tf = 50 to compute an optimal control
t ∈ [0, Tf ]. In left panels (a), we applied 80 iterations (runtime 313.2 s) in the V2 regime with u0(t) = 0. (Top) State
trajectories. After control is applied on t ∈ [0, Tf ], the dynamics are continued without control for a time of length 50.
(Bottom Left) The control u20(t) after 20 iterations. (Bottom Right) Objective scores J(uk) vs iteration number k, where
J(u20) = 6.894 and Θ(u20) = −0.0001. In right panels (b), we set C2 = 0.001 and run 20 iterations (runtime 51.87 s)
with x0 = 0.5, n0 = o0 = 0.8, and A0 in the OTOC regime. We obtain J(u20) = 10.24 and Θ(u20) = −3.271× 10−6.
with λ(Tf ) = [0, 0, 0]>. The pointwise maximizer of H
under the non-negativity constraint on u(t) is
u∗(t) =
{
0 if− (1/C2)λo(o− n) < 0
−(1/C2)λo(o− n) if − (1/C2)λo(o− n) ≥ 0
(21)
An application of Algorithm 1 to the V2 regime is
shown in Figure 5a, where we set C2 = 0.001, γ = 0.5,
θ = 0.5, and [R1, S1, T1, P1] = [3, 1, 6, 2]. Due to the lag
γ, public opinion o(t) overestimates n(t) on the intervals
where n(t) is decreasing, and underestimates when n(t) is
increasing. The resulting awareness control is applied only
during these intervals to push opinion lower towards the
true environmental state, and is not applied (u(t) = 0)
on intervals where n(t) is increasing. Consequently, the
awareness policy promotes cooperative behavior in times
where public opinion overestimates the true environmental
state. The induced dynamics resemble an oscillating tragedy
of the commons.
In Figure 5b, a similar principle holds for the result-
ing controller in the OTOC regime. A single impulse of
awareness control is applied around t = 7, when o(t) ≈
0.16 greatly overestimates n(t) ≈ 0.03. Opinion quickly
decreases to meet n(t), causing a resurgence of cooperators.
No more control is applied for the rest of the horizon.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we extended a game-environment feedback
model [3] to study incentive and opinion control policies
that seek to maximally conserve the environmental state. We
formulated these policies in the setting of optimal control
problems, and solved them by using suitable numerical
techniques. The computed incentive policies are bang-bang
controllers that, counter-intuitively, switch between maximal
promotion and punishment of cooperative behaviors. The
switching times occur near critical points of the environ-
mental state dynamics. We then considered two methods of
influencing public opinion about the environment. The first is
a propaganda-like intervention where an external influencing
agent attempts to sway public opinion. The second aims
to raise public awareness of the current true environmental
state, e.g. through environmental education programs or
awareness campaigns. In simulations, both methods steer
public opinion lower, i.e. convincing the public that the
environment is worse than what it actually is.
We find in certain regimes (V2 and OTOC) that the result-
ing controllers in all three control formulations induce large
oscillations between deplete and replete environment states.
The resulting oscillating tragedy of the commons maximizes
accumulation of common resources because the policies
increase the amount of time spent at high replete states. The
major drawback is that repeated collapses of the resource
are inevitable. This outcome is extremely undesirable if there
are no alternative resource options. Hence, different ways of
thinking about control are necessary.
APPENDIX
For all three problem formulations (5), (14), and (18),
we utilized the optimal control algorithm outlined below in
Algorithm 1. For the interested reader, the details can be
found in [19]. The algorithm is a hill-climbing technique
with Armijo step sizes [21]. Given a control u, it computes
an ascent direction, u?, as follows. First, choose a finite
grid G ⊂ [0, Tf ], which may vary from one iteration to
the next (in this paper, we fix the grid to have uniform
spacing of 0.01). Solve the state trajectory forward and
the costate (adjoint) trajectory backwards, by a numerical
integration method. This yields the Hamiltonian function
H(y,λ, u). For every t ∈ G, compute the maximizer u∗(t) of
H(y(t),λ(t), v) over admissible controls v. Interpolate the
resulting values via zero-order hold to result in the control
u?(t) for every t ∈ [0, Tf ]. The control u? serves as the
direction the algorithm takes from u. The cost functional J
increases along this direction, namely, for a small enough
step size δ > 0,
J(u+ δ(u? − u)) > J(u) (22)
under mild technical conditions. In the algorithm, we use
the Armijo step size, which is computed as follows. For a
given β ∈ (0, 1), and a given α ∈ (0, 1), the step size is
β` where ` is the smallest non-negative integer such that
J(u)− J(u+ β`(u? − u)) ≤ αβ`Θ(u), where
Θ(u) ≡
∫ Tf
0
(H(y,λ, u)−H(y,λ, u∗))dt ≤ 0. (23)
The term Θ(u) serves as an optimality function (see [22]):
It is always non-positive, where Θ(u) = 0 means that u
satisfies PMP. Generally, |Θ(u)|measures the extent to which
u fails to satisfy PMP.
In its general form, the algorithm [19] is defined in the
framework of relaxed controls (probability distributions on
the space of ordinary controls) [23]. However, in the setting
of the problems formulated in this paper, it need only
compute ordinary controls.
Algorithm 1 Hamiltonian-based hill-climbing algorithm
1: procedure
2: k ← 0
3: uk ← Initial guess u0
4: while k < iters do
5: Choose a finite grid Gk ⊂ [0, Tf ].
6: Solve forward for yk(t) using uk
7: Solve backwards for λk(t) using uk(t) and yk(t)
8: Compute, for every t ∈ Gk, u∗(t) =
arg max
u
H(yk,λk, u); interpolate the results to define
u∗(t) ∀ t ∈ [0, Tf ].
9: Compute smallest ` = 0, 1, 2 . . . s.t.
J(uk)− J(uk + β`(u∗ − uk)) ≤ αβ`Θ(uk)
10: uk+1(t)← uk + β`(u∗ − uk)
11: k ← k + 1
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